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the Southern 
movement in yemen
was over and what had come to replace 
it was simply Northern occupation.
With unity came also a political cul-
ture unfamiliar to the South. Corrup-
tion and dishonesty substituted earlier 
good governance.2 It also became evi-
dent that the multi-party system actu-
ally meant choosing the “right” party, 
one that has access to state funds and 
can deliver everything from develop-
ment schemes to land properties and government jobs. Ever since the 
harmony of the early years of unity when government posts were dis-
tributed evenly between Southerners and Northerners, there has been 
no question that the party that delivers is the People’s General Con-
gress, the party of the Republic’s President.
To the disillusionment of the Southerners, the authoritarian system 
of one party rule was simply replaced by clientelism which demanded 
unreserved loyalty to the government in exchange for personal ben-
efits such as a government jobs, expensive cars, or pieces of land; a 
practice they imagined to have originated in the North. Moreover, 
hard-line religious moralizing that spread among the Southerners has 
contributed to the marginalization of women’s earlier visible roles in 
the public sphere.3
There are also economic reasons for dissent. During the 1994 war 
factories in Aden were affected. Machines and raw materials were de-
molished or looted and factories had to send workers, mostly women, 
home. With a salary from the state, these workers just stayed at home 
until years later came their retirement. Now these former factory work-
ers, people in their best productive years, are bitter. With a small pen-
sion that hardly covers daily expenses, they do not waste time in job 
seeking since hardly any new job opportunities have been created. Dr 
Suad Uthman Abdulrahim from Aden University suggests that not only 
rivalry for markets hit the factories but also greed for huge land prop-
erties that the closed factories could release.4 Hunt for lucrative land 
properties has been one of the activities in which the elite has been 
busily engaged. According to some estimates, the Northern elite has 
taken possession of fifty percent of Adeni land. While part of the land 
acquisitions are disputed and some even litigated in court, most land 
distributed is state land without previous private owners.
But political and economic factors are not the only sources of dissent; 
some believe that the two parts of the country have irreversibly differ-
ent cultures, too. While in the North it was common in the early years 
of unity to believe that Southerners are “disbelievers” and that their 
women are “loose,” in the South many viewed Northerners as “ignorant” 
and “looters of state property.” Despite early hope that the two Yemens 
will slowly come together in terms of customs and psychology, South-
erners now think that it is impossible to live with “those people” since 
their culture is entirely different from that of the South. This attitude is 
visible in the manner in which the “South” is symbolically constructed 
in the popular dissent. Bad governance and corruption is thought to be 
characteristic of the Northern culture at large. According to this con-
stellation, the North is imagined as a community of tribes and tribal 
thinking while people in the South are adherents of a nation state ruled 
by state law. Thus the new Southern state is not designed to replicate 
the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen but to be built according to 
principles of equal citizenship.
Protests
In late spring 2007 dissent started to culminate in public demonstra-
tions and increased criticism was voiced in opposition newspapers and 
civil society media. Popular protests spread throughout the former 
South Yemen and the slogan of infisāl (separation) was also raised 
In a video clip posted on Youtube, im-
ages of mutilated bodies follow one 
another followed by the grim face of 
the Yemeni president Ali Abdullah 
Saleh and the text “In this image he is 
swearing, swearing to clean the land 
from the owners … us!!” It continues 
showing maps of Southern Yemen with 
the text “Our land, our country South 
Arabia” ending with the announce-
ment “We don’t believe in war and power, we will return our land in 
peace.” The background music from the popular rock group Linkin Park 
with the song “In the End” lends a youthful tone to the clip.1
While most of the picture material comes from the London-based 
opposition movement’s Sout al-Ganoub (The Voice of the South) 
website that forms only one arm of the locally rooted movement, the 
sentiments in the video reflect well those prevalent throughout the 
country itself. The video has triggered months-long discussions. One 
participant, Oneyedboxer, expresses sentiments common among 
Adeni youth towards the Northern Yemeni rulers: “don’t you forget 
your Imam(s) locked you for years from civilization; don’t you forget 
that when European officials came to visit North Yemen they used to 
tell you that they are Jinns with blue eyes, so that you don’t talk to 
them… How do you expect a government with ninety percent of its 
people illiterate to rule? Shame on you to have someone rule over you 
who does not even have a high school diploma. This is not a war of the 
South and North, it’s a war of Ideology.”
These and similar voices to be found on the Internet point to today’s 
social and political dissent in what used to be South Yemen, which has 
roots in the uneven state-society relationship and the imbalanced de-
velopment of the two parts of the country. Since Yemeni unification 
this imbalance has to some extent deepened despite opposite expec-
tations, resulting in protests and mass demonstrations. While such pro-
test have been stifled by the government, the movement’s presence on 
the Internet is harder to silence.
Unification of the “one Yemeni homeland”
In the area that forms today’s Republic of Yemen, a centralized admin-
istration and state territorial control have proved to be difficult tasks. 
The Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) came into being from a long 
and violent civil war (1962-1969) that brought Egyptian troops and civil 
servants to an area basically untouched by foreign rule. The republican 
state never managed to establish full territorial sovereignty and large 
parts of Northern and Eastern regions still today remain under tribal 
control. In the South, the rulers managed to do something the British 
had failed a little earlier when in 1967 they formed a nation state out of 
the British Colony (Aden) and the two Aden protectorates: the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).
Whereas the unification in 22 May 1990 was at first enthusiastically 
welcomed by everybody in Yemen, years that followed crushed the il-
lusions in the South. High inflation, inefficiency in running the state 
fiscals, centralization of state bureaucracy and the accompanied mar-
ginalization of Southern administrative centres formed the basis of dis-
satisfaction. Once World Bank policies started to frame socio-economic 
development impoverishment befell not only the poor but also many 
among the middle sectors of society. These were accompanied by kid-
nappings, house robberies, and murders of Southern politicians – pre-
sumably linked to president Saleh. By 1993 it became clear that the 
unity was not on a solid ground and the Southern leaders withdrew to 
Aden. The short but devastating civil war was fought in early summer 
of 1994 between the Northern and Southern army factions. Emerging 
from the war, Southern popular sentiment was that the honeymoon 
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During the past year, people of the former 
South Yemen Republic have joined a popular 
movement demanding fair rule and equal 
citizenship against which the Yemeni 
government has taken harsh methods. While 
the western world concentrates on Al-Qaida and 
kidnapped tourists, the movement has taken 
a visible presence on the Internet, which offers 
a whole new platform for political protest.
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A sit-in in 
support of 
the opposition 
newspaper 
al-Ayaam in 
March 2008 
in Aden
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be united with Northern cities where the above demonstrations have 
taken place. A lot will depend on the changes that are evident when Ali 
Abdullah Saleh’s presidential term ends in 2013.
Still the Southern Movement has attracted also Northerners in its 
ranks. One of the most well-known is Dr Muhammad al-Saqqaf, law-
yer and university professor who has joined the demands for seces-
sion from the North. When I met him in a sit-in in Aden in March 2008, 
he enthusiastically showed the orange t-shirt and basketball cap that 
he brought from Dhala’. In waiting for international attention, the 
Dhala’ian movement has created a visual image and presence on the 
Internet, inspired by Eastern European popular uprisings. With these 
postmodern elements to fashion the popular uprising, the movement 
wants to show the world that the Southern Yemeni cause deserves glo-
bal media attention, the way of other troubled lands of Tibet, Zimba-
bwe or Ukraine. While the protests have continued a good part of 2008, 
the Southern rebellion finally made top headlines in all international 
news networks at the end of March 2008 to be faded under news about 
the “Yemeni Al-Qaida.”
Parliamentary elections are due in April 2009. However, people joke 
about their need to get to vote in the US elections as whatever hap-
pens on the superpower’s political stage will have a bigger effect on 
their lives than the results of the Yemeni elections.
Meanwhile, in a manner typical to Yemeni politics at large, elite re-
sponse to the problems in the South has been to establish new “civil 
society” bodies. Two competing committees have been established 
to ensure a smooth move towards a democratic process and to end 
the civil unrest. The first one, established by Presidential Decree and 
headed by one of President’s Southern allies, was charged with the 
task to evaluate the situation in the South and to 
find solutions to calm down popular dissent and 
to work towards enhancing national unity. A com-
peting committee, the Yemeni Centre for Histori-
cal Studies and Future Strategies, was to follow, 
set up by prominent Northern army generals, and 
members of the political elite and intelligentsia 
from both South and North. While it is clear that 
the former committee works in close contact with 
the government and the latter one with the op-
position parties, it remains to be seen whether 
this truly Yemeni solution to the problem, setting 
up of new “NGOs” to hold meetings preferably in 
five-star hotels, ever finds feasible solutions to 
the deep-rooted dissent prevalent throughout 
the country.
among al-harakat al-ganubiyyat (Southern movement) as 
the movement is popularly known. The movement is partic-
ularly strong in Hadhramaut governorate to the east where 
most of oil wealth comes from. The activities there have in-
cluded stopping Northern people from buying or confiscat-
ing land, erecting road blocs to harass drivers with Northern 
license plates, and pushing demands for getting at least 
twenty percent of the oil income.
The Southern movement has no national leadership or 
joint organization and locally takes a variety of forms. It has 
been most active in small towns in Dhala’ governorate, some 
hundred kilometres north of Aden where the 1963 Southern 
revolution had its starting point. These locally based initia-
tives are not necessarily connected to exiled Yemenis who 
have formed the Southern Democratic Assembly (TAJ) in 
London, or with the National Opposition Front (MOWJ), an 
older resistance coalition working from outside but active 
on the Internet.
The movement unites people of all social strata. It was 
sparked in spring 2007 by popular protests organized by the 
Yemeni Retired Military Consultative Association, formed by 
former military commanders and army men. Following the 
1994 reorganization of the army, these men feel they have 
faced systematic discrimination. Often accompanied by unemployed 
youth, former civil servants and factory workers, as well as human 
rights activists, demonstrations have been staged in front of local gov-
ernment premises. Due to lack of job opportunities and discrimination 
in access to foreign education, youth with university and high school 
diplomas have also joined the movement. Since the revolution this is 
the first time young people have taken an active role in politics, which 
predicts a good future for civil society activities in the South at large.
Notwithstanding the arrest of leaders of the Yemeni Socialist Party 
(YSP), political parties and the opposition united in the Joint Meeting 
Parties (JMP) largely remain outside the movement. These parties, most 
notably the Islah Party (Congregation for Reform) and the YSP took a 
long time to announce support to the movement. In addition, activists 
of the movement regard the opposition parties’ cooperation with the 
government with aversion. 
Secession or federation
While most people in the South view that a change is necessary, not 
all agree that secession would be the right solution. Another scheme is 
federation where each governorate (Yemen is divided into 21 governo-
rates) could enjoy autonomy, including deciding on its own norms for 
public morality. A group of religious personalities recently demanded 
the establishment of a state body to monitor public virtues in the man-
ner of Saudi Arabia, causing alarm among Southerners.
In another upsetting incidence Nasir al-Shaibani, the former Minister 
of Religious Endowments (awqaf) and currently preacher in a Northern 
mosque, issued a fatwa against the protestors calling them “Infidels” 
and “Communists” who want to “Christianize and Americanize the coun-
try,” thus applying rhetoric typical to some Islamist groups throughout 
the Middle East. In response, the Coordination Council of Military and 
Civil Retirees Societies, joined by the unemployed youth committees in 
all Southern governorates, filed a lawsuit against the former minister 
accusing him of instigating bloodshed in the demonstrations.
Still the question of secession and re-establishing a state to the terri-
tory that used to be the PDRY is not an uncomplicated issue. Historical-
ly a big number of Adenis have roots in Ta’izz area just across the former 
border. These Adenis object to any secession even if otherwise favour-
able to the Southern cause. While culturally Ta’izz resembles the South, 
inclusion of this fertile area in a secessionist state would be out of the 
question for the mighty Northern highland tribes. To the Yemeni state 
the movement poses a big challenge alongside other problems caused 
by sympathizers of Al-Qaida and the armed conflict that was going on 
in the Northern province of Sa’ada for years, all making foreign ana-
lysts call Yemen a potential failed state.5 It is evident that the govern-
ment cannot just suppress the movement and disregard its demands. 
Throughout Yemen similar anti-government protests have occurred 
where demands for price regulation, fair rule, measures to eradicate 
poverty and equal distribution among regions of national resources, 
and development schemes have been raised. Unless the movement 
stops being framed as a movement for the South it is unlikely that it will 
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